at never were more serious
charges, etc.," and second:--

"When Mr. Seward had finished reading the despatch I remained silent. [I
allowed the pain which the contents of it had caused me to be apparent
in my countenance, but I said nothing. From my knowledge of Mr. Seward's
character, I was sure that at the moment nothing which I could say would
make so much impression upon him as my maintaining an absolute silence.]
After a short pause, etc." (F.O., America, Vol. 773. No. 607. Lyons to
Russell, Oct. 28, 1861).]

[Footnote 381: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1861.]

[Footnote 382: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 2, 1861.]

[Footnote 383: Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Nov. 12. 1861. He
added, "The dismissal of Bunch seems to me a singular mixture of the
bully and coward."]

[Footnote 384: _Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 26. Russell
to Adams, Dec. 9, 1861.]

[Footnote 385: Bonham, _British Consuls in the Confederacy_, p. 45.
Columbia University, _Studies in History, Economics and Public Law_,
XI-III. No. 3. Bonham shows that Bunch was more pro-Southern than Lyons
thought. Lyons had suggested that Bunch be permitted to remain privately
at Charleston. (_Parliamentary Papers_, 1862, _Lords_, Vol. XXV.
"Correspondence on the Withdrawal of Bunch's Exequatur." No. 29. Lyons
to Russell, Dec. 31, 1861.) That Bunch was after all regarded by the
United States as a scapegoat may be argued from the "curious
circumstance that in 1875, Mr. Bunch, being then British Minister
resident at Bogota, acted as arbitrator in a case between the United
States and Colombia." (Moore, _Int. Law Digest_, V, p. 22.)]

[Footnote 386: Bancroft, _Seward, II_, p. 203, says that if Great
Britain ever attempted another negotiation "that British representatives
were careful to preserve perfect secrecy." I have found no evidence of
any similar communication with the South.]

[Footnote 387: As early as April, 1861, Stoeckl reported Mercier as
urging Lyons and Stoeckl to secure from their respective Governments
authority to recognize the South whenever they thought "the right time"
had come. Lyons did not wish to have this responsibility, arguing that
the mere fact of such a decision being left to him would embarrass him
in his relations with the North. Stoeckl also opposed Mercier's idea,
and added that Russia could well afford to wait until England an