o
be the result of the French arguments at London and Washington
advocating a vigorous American policy. October 19, Lyons and Mercier
renewed debate on exactly the same lines as previously, Mercier this
time reading to Lyons an instruction from Thouvenel and his reply. Lyons
insisted that the North would most certainly declare war on any power
that recognized the South and asserted that such a war would cause more
suffering many times than all the suffering now caused by the shortage
of cotton. Yet Lyons felt compelled to use caution and conciliation in
dealing with Mercier, because of the desire to preserve close harmony of
attitude[390]. A few clays later Lyons' comments seemed wholly justified
when Mercier reported to him the tone of a conversation with Seward,
after having left with him a copy of Thouvenel's instruction. Seward
said plainly that the United States would go to war with any foreign
power that tried to interfere and that the only way in which France
could get cotton was by a Northern conquest of the South. He
acknowledged that the United States might be defeated, but he informed
Mercier that France would at least know there had been a war. On his
part Mercier told Seward that in his opinion there was but one possible
outcome in America--separation--and that he had advised Thouvenel that
the true policy of England and France was to recognize the South and
"bring about a peaceful separation." Lyons' comment to Russell is that
Seward had certainly taken a "high" tone--evident justification of
Lyons' previously expressed opinion. Seward had been very eager to learn
whether England knew of Thouvenel's instruction, to which Mercier
replied "no," and was now anxious that Russell should not reveal to
Adams that Lyons had known the contents before delivery to Seward--a
caution with which Lyons was very content[391].

Lyons' first report of Mercier's ideas had been received in London at a
rather critical moment. On October 17, just after Adams' complaint about
Bunch and Russell's answer, while waiting to see whether Seward would
magnify that incident into a cause of rupture, and four days before
Bunch's "unsatisfactory explanation" had been received, Russell wrote to
Palmerston:

"There is much good sense in Mercier's observations.
But we must wait. I am persuaded that if we do anything,
it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England
and France to break a blockade for the sake of ge