to this chapter are yet not without interest. There was no
case during the Civil War of a vessel actually going out as a privateer
(i.e., a private vessel operating under government letters of marque)
from a foreign port. (Adams, "Seward and the Declaration of Paris," p.
38.) No Southern privateer ever entered a British port. (Bernard,
_Neutrality of Great Britain_, p. 181). As a result of Seward's general
instruction of April 24, a convention was actually signed with Russia in
August, but it was not presented by Seward for ratification to the
United States Senate. Schleiden in a report to the Senate of Bremen at
the time of the _Trent_ affair, Nov. 14, 1861, stated that the Russian
Ambassador, von Stoeckl, inquired of Seward "whether the U.S. would
equip privateers in case war should break out with England and France.
Seward replied 'that is a matter of course.' Mr. Stoeckl thereupon
remarked that in any case no American privateer would be permitted to
cruise in the northern part of the Pacific because Russia, which is the
only state that has ports in those regions, would treat them as pirates
in accordance with the Convention of August 24. Mr. Seward then
exclaimed: 'I never thought of that. I must write to Mr. Clay about
it.'" (Schleiden MS.)]
CHAPTER VI
BULL RUN; CONSUL BUNCH; COTTON AND MERCIER
The diplomatic manoeuvres and interchanges recounted in the preceding
chapter were regarded by Foreign Secretaries and Ministers as important
in themselves and as indicative of national policy and purpose. Upon all
parties concerned they left a feeling of irritation and suspicion. But
the public knew nothing of the details of the inconclusive negotiation
and the Press merely gave a hint now and then of its reported progress
and ultimate failure. Newspapers continued to report the news from
America in unaccustomed detail, but that news, after the attack on Fort
Sumter, was for some time lacking in striking incident, since both sides
in America were busily engaged in preparing for a struggle in arms for
which neither was immediately prepared. April 15, Lincoln called for
75,000 volunteers, and three weeks later for 42,000 additional. The
regular army was increased by 23,000 and the navy by 18,000 men. Naval
vessels widely scattered over the globe, were instructed to hasten their
home-coming. By July 1 Lincoln had an available land force, however
badly trained and organized, of over 300,000, though these were widely
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