ed on the simple
and straightforward theory that the United States, pursuing a
conciliatory policy, was now offering to adhere to international rules
advocated by all the maritime powers. As a result he felt both
personally and patriotically aggrieved that suspicion was directed
toward the American overtures[315]. For him the failure of the
negotiation had temporarily, at least, an unfortunate result: "So far
as the assumed friendliness of Earl Russell to the United States was
concerned, the scales had fallen from his eyes. His faith in the
straightforwardness of any portion of the Palmerston-Russell Ministry
was gone[316]."

And for Russell also the affair spelled a certain disillusionment, not,
it is true, in the good faith of Adams, for whom he still preserved a
high regard. Russell felt that his policy of a straightforward British
neutrality, his quick acquiescence in the blockade, even before actually
effective, his early order closing British ports to prizes of
Confederate privateers[317], were all evidences of at least a friendly
attitude toward the North. He may, as did nearly every Englishman at the
moment, think the re-union of America impossible, but he had begun with
the plan of strict neutrality, and certainly with no thought of
offensive action against the North. His first thought in the Declaration
of Paris negotiation was to persuade both belligerents to acquiesce in a
portion of the rules of that Declaration, but almost at once he saw the
larger advantage to the world of a complete adherence by the United
States. This became Russell's fixed idea in which he persisted against
warnings and obstacles. Because of this he attempted to recall the
instruction to approach the South, was ready even, until prohibited by
Palmerston, to depart from a policy of close joint action with France,
and in the end was forced by that prohibition to make a limiting
declaration guarding British neutrality. In it all there is no evidence
of any hidden motive nor of any other than a straightforward, even if
obstinately blind, procedure. The effect on Russell, at last grudgingly
admitting that there had been a "trap," was as unfortunate for good
understanding as in the case of Adams. He also was irritated,
suspicious, and soon less convinced that a policy of strict neutrality
could long be maintained[318].

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 236: VII., pp. 568-583.]

[Footnote 237: Ch. 8.]

[Footnote 238: _Ibid._, p. 181.]

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