-August for the
affixing of signatures, when Russell, in execution of his previous
promise, and evidently now impressed with the need of an explicit
understanding, gave notice of his intended declaration in writing to be
attached to the convention[312]. On August 20 both Adams and Dayton
refused to sign, the former taking the ground, and with evident
sincerity, that the "exception" gave evidence of a British suspicion
that was insulting to his country, while Dayton had "hardly concealed"
from Thouvenel that this same "exception" was the very object of the
Convention[313]. While preparing his rejoinder to Adams' complaint
Russell wrote in a note to Palmerston "it all looks as if a trap had
been prepared[314]." He, too, at last, was forced to a conclusion long
since reached by every other diplomat, save Adams, engaged in this
negotiation.
But in reviewing the details of the entire affair it would appear that
in its initiation by Seward there is no proof that he then thought of
any definite "trap". April 24 antedated any knowledge by Seward of
British or French policy on neutrality, and he was engaged in attempting
to secure a friendly attitude by foreign Powers. One means of doing this
was by giving assurances on maritime law in time of war. True he
probably foresaw an advantage through expected aid in repressing
privateering, but primarily he hoped to persuade the maritime Powers not
to recognize Southern belligerency. It was in fact this question of
belligerency that determined all his policy throughout the first six
months of the American conflict. He was obstinately determined to
maintain that no such status existed, and throughout the whole war he
returned again and again to pressure on foreign Powers to recall their
proclamations of neutrality. Refusing to recognize foreign neutrality as
final Seward persisted in this negotiation in the hope that if completed
it would place Great Britain and France in a position where they would
be forced to reconsider their declared policy. A demand upon them to aid
in suppressing privateering might indeed then be used as an argument,
but the object was not privateering in itself; that object was the
recall of the recognition of Southern belligerency. In the end he simply
could not agree to the limiting declaration for it would have
constituted an acknowledgment by the United States itself of the
existence of a state of war.
In all of this Adams, seemingly, had no share. He act
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