, the South would
not dare to hold out and no "menace" would be required[293]. Six days
later, however, having learned from the French Ambassador that Dayton in
Paris had made clear to Thouvenel the expectation of the United States
that France would treat Southern privateers as pirates, Russell wrote
that England, of course, could not agree to any such conclusion[294].
Nevertheless this did not mean that Russell yet saw any real objection
to concluding a convention with the United States. Apparently he could
not believe that so obvious an inconsistency with the declared
neutrality of Great Britain was expected to be obtained by the American
Secretary of State.
Others were more suspicious. Lyons reported on June 13 that Seward had
specifically informed Mercier of his belief that a convention signed
would bind England and France to aid in suppressing Southern
privateering[295]. The effect of this on Lyons and Mercier was to
impress upon them the advisability of an _official_ notification to
Seward, of English and French neutrality--a step not yet taken and which
was still postponed, awaiting further instructions[296]. On June 15 the
two Ministers finally concluded they could no longer delay and made that
joint visit to Seward which resulted in his refusal to receive them as
acting together, or to receive officially their instructions, though he
read these for his private information. The remainder of June was spent
by Lyons in attempting to put matters on a more formal basis, yet not
pushing them unduly for fear of arousing Seward's anger. June 17, Lyons
told Seward, privately, and alone, that Great Britain _must_ have some
intercourse with the South if only for the protection of British
interests. Seward's reply was that the United States might "shut its
eyes" to this, but that if notified of what England and France were
doing, the United States would be compelled to make protest. Lyons
thereupon urged Seward to distinguish between his official and personal
knowledge, but Lyons and Mercier again postponed beginning the
negotiation with the Confederacy[297]. Yet while thus reporting this
postponement in one letter, Lyons, in another letter of the same date,
indicated that the two Ministers thought that they had found a solution
of the problem of how to approach, yet not negotiate with, the
Confederacy. The idea was Mercier's. Their consuls in the South were to
be instructed to go, not to the Southern President, but to th
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