ot at all unlikely that either from foolish and
uncalculating arrogance and self-sufficiency or from political
calculation Mr. Seward may bring on a quarrel with us[222]." He believed
that more troops ought to be sent to Canada, as a precautionary
measure, but, he added, "the main Force for Defence must, of course, be
local"--a situation necessarily a cause for anxiety by British
Ministers. Russell was less perturbed. He had previously expressed
appreciation of Adams' conduct, writing to Lyons: "Mr. Adams has made a
very favourable impression on my mind as a calm and judicious man[223],"
and he now wrote: "I do not think Mr. Seward's colleagues will encourage
him in a game of brag with England.... I am sorry Seward turns out so
reckless and ruthless. Adams seems a sensible man[224]." But at
Washington Lyons was again hot on the trail of warlike rumours. As a
result of a series of conversations with Northern politicians, not
Cabinet members, he sent a cipher telegram to Russell on June 6,
stating: "No new event has occurred but sudden declaration of war by the
United States against Great Britain appears to me by no means
impossible, especially so long as Canada seems open to invasion[225]."
This was followed two days later by a despatch dilating upon the
probability of war, and ending with Lyons' opinion of how it should be
conducted. England should strike at once with the largest possible naval
force and bring the war to an end before the United States could
prepare. Otherwise, "the spirit, the energy, and the resources of this
people" would make them difficult to overcome. England, on her part,
must be prepared to suffer severely from American privateers, and she
would be forced to help the South, at least to the extent of keeping
Southern ports open. Finally, Lyons concluded, all of this letter and
advice were extremely distasteful to him, yet he felt compelled to write
it by the seriousness of the situation. Nevertheless, he would exert
every effort and use every method to conciliate America[226].
In truth, it was not any further belligerent talk by Seward that had so
renewed Lyons' anxiety. Rather it was the public and Press reception of
the news of the Queen's Proclamation of Neutrality. The Northern people,
counting beyond all reasonable expectation upon British sympathy on
anti-slavery grounds, had been angrily disappointed, and were at the
moment loudly voicing their vexation. Had Seward not already been turned
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