st
preventative of war with the United States is to show that England is
ready for it[214].

It was an anxious time for the British Minister in Washington. May 22,
he warned Sir Edmund Head, Governor of Canada, urging him to make
defensive preparation[215]. The following day he dilated to Russell,
privately, on "the difficulty of keeping Mr. Seward within the bounds of
decency even in ordinary social intercourse[216] ..." and in an official
communication of this same day he records Washington rumours of a
belligerent despatch read by Seward before the Cabinet, of objections by
other members, and that Seward's insistence has carried the day[217].
That Seward was, in fact, still smarting over his reverse is shown by a
letter, written on this same May 23, to his intimate friend and
political adviser, Thurlow Weed, who had evidently cautioned him against
precipitate action. Seward wrote, "The European phase is bad. But your
apprehension that I may be too decisive alarms me more. Will you
consent, or advise us to consent, that Adams and Dayton have audiences
and compliments in the Ministers' Audience Chamber, and Toombs'
[Confederate Secretary of State] emissaries have access to his
bedroom[218]?"

Two interpretations are possible from this: either that Seward knowing
himself defeated was bitter in retrospect, or that he had not yet
yielded his will to that of Lincoln, in spite of the changes made in his
Despatch No. 10. The former interpretation seems the more likely, for
though Seward continued to write for a time "vigorous" despatches to
Adams, they none of them approached the vigour of even the amended
despatch. Moreover, the exact facts of the Cabinet of May 21, and the
complete reversal of Seward's policy were sufficiently known by May 24
to have reached the ears of Schleiden, who reported them in a letter to
Bremen of that date[219]. And on the same day Seward himself told
Schleiden that he did "not fear any longer that it would come to a break
with England[220]." On May 27 Lyons himself, though still suspicious
that an attempt was being made to separate France and England, was able
to report a better tone from Seward[221].

British Ministers in London were not so alarmed as was Lyons, but they
were disturbed, nevertheless, and long preserved a suspicion of the
American Secretary of State. May 23, Palmerston wrote to Russell in
comment on Lyons' despatch of May 2: "These communications are very
unpleasant. It is n