stillborn.
The incident was a vital one in the Northern administration, for Seward
at last realized that the President intended to control policy, and
though it was yet long before he came to appreciate fully Lincoln's
customary calm judgment, he did understand the relation now established
between himself and his chief. Henceforth, he obeyed orders, though
free in suggestion and criticism, always welcome to Lincoln. The latter,
avowedly ignorant of diplomacy, gladly left details to Seward, and the
altered despatch, far from making relations difficult, rendered them
simple and easy, by clearing the atmosphere. But it was otherwise with
Foreign Ministers at Washington, for even though there was soon a "leak"
of gossip informing them of what had taken place in regard to Despatch
No. 10, they one and all were fearful of a recovery of influence by
Seward and of a resumption of belligerent policy. This was particularly
true of Lord Lyons, for rumour had it that it was against England that
Seward most directed his enmity. There resulted for British diplomats
both at Washington and in London a deep-seated suspicion of Seward, long
after he had made a complete face-about in policy. This suspicion
influenced relations greatly in the earlier years of the Civil War.
On May 20, the day before Seward's No. 10 was dated, Lyons wrote a long
twelve-page despatch to Russell, anxious, and very full of Seward's
warlike projects. "The President is, of course, wholly ignorant of
foreign countries, and of foreign affairs." "Seward, having lost
strength by the failure of his peace policy, is seeking to recover
influence by leading a foreign war party; no one in the Cabinet is
strong enough to combat him." Britain, Lyons thought, should maintain a
stiff attitude, prepare to defend Canada, and make close contacts with
France. He was evidently anxious to impress upon Russell that Seward
really might mean war, but he declared the chief danger to lie in the
fact of American belief that England and France could not be driven into
war with the United States, and that they would submit to any insult.
Lyons urged some action, or declaration (he did not know what), to
correct this false impression[213]. Again, on the next day, May 21, the
information in his official despatch was repeated in a private letter to
Russell, but Lyons here interprets Seward's threats as mere bluster. Yet
he is not absolutely sure of this, and in any case insists that the be
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