.

Lyons put no faith in all this but was happy to note the change,
mistakenly attributing it to England's "stiff tone," and not at all to
the veto of the President. Since Lyons himself had gone to the utmost
bounds in seeking conciliation (so he had reported), and, in London,
Russell also had taken no forward step since the issue of the Queen's
Proclamation--indeed, had rather yielded somewhat to Adams'
representations--it is not clear in what the "stiff tone" consisted.

Indeed, the cause of Seward's explanation to Lyons was the receipt of a
despatch from Adams, dated June 28, in which the latter had reported
that all was now smooth sailing. He had told Russell that the knowledge
in Washington of the result of their previous interviews had brought
satisfaction, and Russell, for his part, said that Lyons had "learned,
through another member of the diplomatic corps, that no further
expression of opinion on the subject in question would be
necessary[232]." This referred, presumably, to the question of British
intention, for the future, in relation to the Proclamation of
Neutrality. Adams wrote: "This led to the most frank and pleasant
conversation which I have yet had with his lordship.... I added that I
believed the popular feeling in the United States would subside the
moment that all the later action on this side was known.... My own
reception has been all that I could desire. I attach value to this,
however, only as it indicates the establishment of a policy that will
keep us at peace during the continuance of the present convulsion." In
reply to Adams' despatch, Seward wrote on July 21, the day after his
interview with Lyons, arguing at great length the American view that the
British Proclamation of Neutrality in a domestic quarrel was not
defensible in international law. There was not now, nor later, any
yielding on this point. But, for the present, this was intended for
Adams' eye alone, and Seward prefaced his argument by a disclaimer, much
as stated to Lyons, of any ill-will to Great Britain:

"I may add, also, for myself, that however otherwise I may at
any time have been understood, it has been an earnest and
profound solicitude to avert from foreign war; that alone has
prompted the emphatic and sometimes, perhaps, impassioned
remonstrances I have hitherto made against any form or
measure of recognition of the insurgents by the government of
Great Britain. I write in the s