n For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
From the New York Packet. Friday, March 21, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the executive
authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It is evident
that, without proper attention to this article, the separation of the
executive from the legislative department would be merely nominal and
nugatory. The legislature, with a discretionary power over the salary
and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could render him as obsequious
to their will as they might think proper to make him. They might, in
most cases, either reduce him by famine, or tempt him by largesses,
to surrender at discretion his judgment to their inclinations. These
expressions, taken in all the latitude of the terms, would no doubt
convey more than is intended. There are men who could neither be
distressed nor won into a sacrifice of their duty; but this stern virtue
is the growth of few soils; and in the main it will be found that
a power over a man's support is a power over his will. If it were
necessary to confirm so plain a truth by facts, examples would not be
wanting, even in this country, of the intimidation or seduction of the
Executive by the terrors or allurements of the pecuniary arrangements of
the legislative body.
It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the judicious attention
which has been paid to this subject in the proposed Constitution. It is
there provided that "The President of the United States shall, at stated
times, receive for his services a compensation which shall neither be
increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been
elected; and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument
from the United States, or any of them." It is impossible to imagine
any provision which would have been more eligible than this. The
legislature, on the appointment of a President, is once for all to
declare what shall be the compensation for his services during the time
for which he shall have been elected. This done, they will have no power
to alter it, either by increase or diminution, till a new period
of service by a new election commences. They can neither weaken his
fortitude by operating on his necessities, nor corrupt his integrity
by appealing to his avarice. Neither the Union, nor any of its members,
will be at liberty to give, nor will he be at lib
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