he rule which has obtained in
the courts for determining their relative validity is, that the last in
order of time shall be preferred to the first. But this is a mere rule
of construction, not derived from any positive law, but from the nature
and reason of the thing. It is a rule not enjoined upon the courts by
legislative provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth
and propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the
law. They thought it reasonable, that between the interfering acts of an
EQUAL authority, that which was the last indication of its will should
have the preference.
But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate
authority, of an original and derivative power, the nature and reason of
the thing indicate the converse of that rule as proper to be followed.
They teach us that the prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to
the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that
accordingly, whenever a particular statute contravenes the Constitution,
it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter
and disregard the former.
It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense of a
repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the constitutional
intentions of the legislature. This might as well happen in the case
of two contradictory statutes; or it might as well happen in every
adjudication upon any single statute. The courts must declare the sense
of the law; and if they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of
JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the substitution of their
pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if it prove
any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from
that body.
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks
of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this
consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of
judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that
independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and
whic
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