suffice under the new as well
as the old. As to ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign
countries, the proposed Constitution can make no other difference than
to render their characters, where they reside, more respectable,
and their services more useful. As to persons to be employed in the
collection of the revenues, it is unquestionably true that these will
form a very considerable addition to the number of federal officers;
but it will not follow that this will occasion an increase of public
expense. It will be in most cases nothing more than an exchange of State
for national officers. In the collection of all duties, for instance,
the persons employed will be wholly of the latter description. The
States individually will stand in no need of any for this purpose.
What difference can it make in point of expense to pay officers of the
customs appointed by the State or by the United States? There is no good
reason to suppose that either the number or the salaries of the latter
will be greater than those of the former.

Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of expense which
are to swell the account to the enormous size that has been represented
to us? The chief item which occurs to me respects the support of the
judges of the United States. I do not add the President, because there
is now a president of Congress, whose expenses may not be far, if any
thing, short of those which will be incurred on account of the President
of the United States. The support of the judges will clearly be an extra
expense, but to what extent will depend on the particular plan which may
be adopted in regard to this matter. But upon no reasonable plan can it
amount to a sum which will be an object of material consequence.

Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any extra expense that
may attend the establishment of the proposed government. The first thing
which presents itself is that a great part of the business which now
keeps Congress sitting through the year will be transacted by the
President. Even the management of foreign negotiations will naturally
devolve upon him, according to general principles concerted with the
Senate, and subject to their final concurrence. Hence it is evident that
a portion of the year will suffice for the session of both the Senate
and the House of Representatives; we may suppose about a fourth for the
latter and a third, or perhaps half, for the former. The extra busine