nt, that amendment must infallibly take place. There
can, therefore, be no comparison between the facility of affecting an
amendment, and that of establishing in the first instance a complete
Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been
urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the national
government will always be disinclined to yield up any portion of
the authority of which they were once possessed. For my own part I
acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments which may, upon
mature consideration, be thought useful, will be applicable to the
organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers; and on
this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just
stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account.
The intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any rate,
independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and
integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the national
rulers the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable
expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further
consideration, which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the
observation is futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever
nine States concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth
article of the plan, the Congress will be obliged "on the application of
the legislatures of two thirds of the States (which at present amount
to nine), to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be
valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution, when
ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or by
conventions in three fourths thereof." The words of this article are
peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention." Nothing in this
particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of consequence,
all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes in
air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or
three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may affect
local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty
in a union on points which are merely relative to the general liberty
or security of the people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the
State legislatures to erect barriers against the encroachments of the
national authority.
If the fo
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