had an extensive circulation.
It is certainly well worthy the perusal of every friend to his country.
There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of amendments
still remains to be considered, and in which it has not yet been
exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first
taking a survey of it in this aspect.

It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it will
be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the
Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it
becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new
decision of each State. To its complete establishment throughout the
Union, it will therefore require the concurrence of thirteen States. If,
on the contrary, the Constitution proposed should once be ratified
by all the States as it stands, alterations in it may at any time be
effected by nine States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to
nine(2) in favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original
adoption of an entire system.

This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must
inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen
independent States are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions
of interest. We may of course expect to see, in any body of men charged
with its original formation, very different combinations of the
parts upon different points. Many of those who form a majority on
one question, may become the minority on a second, and an association
dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence the
necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to
compose the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the
compact; and hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and
casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The degree
of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of
particulars and the number of parties.

But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be
a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would
then be no necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any
other point--no giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number
would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue. And consequently,
whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united in the desire of a
particular amendme