ss
of treaties and appointments may give this extra occupation to the
Senate. From this circumstance we may infer that, until the House of
Representatives shall be increased greatly beyond its present number,
there will be a considerable saving of expense from the difference
between the constant session of the present and the temporary session of
the future Congress.

But there is another circumstance of great importance in the view of
economy. The business of the United States has hitherto occupied
the State legislatures, as well as Congress. The latter has made
requisitions which the former have had to provide for. Hence it
has happened that the sessions of the State legislatures have been
protracted greatly beyond what was necessary for the execution of the
mere local business of the States. More than half their time has been
frequently employed in matters which related to the United States. Now
the members who compose the legislatures of the several States amount to
two thousand and upwards, which number has hitherto performed what under
the new system will be done in the first instance by sixty-five persons,
and probably at no future period by above a fourth or fifth of that
number. The Congress under the proposed government will do all the
business of the United States themselves, without the intervention of
the State legislatures, who thenceforth will have only to attend to
the affairs of their particular States, and will not have to sit in any
proportion as long as they have heretofore done. This difference in the
time of the sessions of the State legislatures will be clear gain,
and will alone form an article of saving, which may be regarded as an
equivalent for any additional objects of expense that may be occasioned
by the adoption of the new system.

The result from these observations is that the sources of additional
expense from the establishment of the proposed Constitution are much
fewer than may have been imagined; that they are counterbalanced by
considerable objects of saving; and that while it is questionable on
which side the scale will preponderate, it is certain that a government
less expensive would be incompetent to the purposes of the Union.

PUBLIUS

1. Vide Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 1, p. 136.

2. Idem, Vol. 4, p. 438.

3. To show that there is a power in the Constitution by which the
liberty of the press may be affected, recourse has been had to the power
of taxation. It is sai