o be invested, through one supreme tribunal, and
a certain number of inferior ones, to be instituted by them. The first
excludes, the last admits, the concurrent jurisdiction of the State
tribunals; and as the first would amount to an alienation of State power
by implication, the last appears to me the most natural and the most
defensible construction.
But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only clearly applicable
to those descriptions of causes of which the State courts have previous
cognizance. It is not equally evident in relation to cases which may
grow out of, and be peculiar to, the Constitution to be established; for
not to allow the State courts a right of jurisdiction in such cases, can
hardly be considered as the abridgment of a pre-existing authority. I
mean not therefore to contend that the United States, in the course
of legislation upon the objects intrusted to their direction, may not
commit the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation to
the federal courts solely, if such a measure should be deemed expedient;
but I hold that the State courts will be divested of no part of their
primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal; and I
am even of opinion that in every case in which they were not expressly
excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, they will of
course take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth.
This I infer from the nature of judiciary power, and from the general
genius of the system. The judiciary power of every government looks
beyond its own local or municipal laws, and in civil cases lays hold
of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction,
though the causes of dispute are relative to the laws of the most
distant part of the globe. Those of Japan, not less than of New York,
may furnish the objects of legal discussion to our courts. When in
addition to this we consider the State governments and the national
governments, as they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as
parts of ONE WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State
courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under
the laws of the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited.
Here another question occurs: What relation would subsist between the
national and State courts in these instances of concurrent jurisdiction?
I answer, that an appeal would certainly lie from the latter, to the
Supr
|