h, though they speedily give place to better information, and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion
dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community. Though I trust the friends of the proposed
Constitution will never concur with its enemies,(3) in questioning that
fundamental principle of republican government, which admits the right
of the people to alter or abolish the established Constitution, whenever
they find it inconsistent with their happiness, yet it is not to be
inferred from this principle, that the representatives of the people,
whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of
their constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing
Constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of
those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater obligation
to connive at infractions in this shape, than when they had proceeded
wholly from the cabals of the representative body. Until the people
have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the
established form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well
as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their
sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it,
prior to such an act. But it is easy to see, that it would require an
uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful
guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had
been instigated by the major voice of the community.
But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only, that
the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the
effects of occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend
no farther than to the injury of the private rights of particular
classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness
of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the
severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves
to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed,
but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them;
who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention
are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner
compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they meditate, to
qualify their attempts. This i
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