proper for the federal jurisdiction, the
latter for that of the States. But it is at least problematical, whether
an unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of controversy
was wholly relative to the lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be
an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which violated the
stipulations of a treaty or the general law of nations. And a still
greater objection to the distinction would result from the immense
difficulty, if not impossibility, of a practical discrimination
between the cases of one complexion and those of the other. So great
a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties, involve
national questions, that it is by far most safe and most expedient to
refer all those in which they are concerned to the national tribunals.
The power of determining causes between two States, between one State
and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of different
States, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the Union than
that which has been just examined. History gives us a horrid picture of
the dissensions and private wars which distracted and desolated Germany
prior to the institution of the Imperial Chamber by Maximilian, towards
the close of the fifteenth century; and informs us, at the same time,
of the vast influence of that institution in appeasing the disorders and
establishing the tranquillity of the empire. This was a court invested
with authority to decide finally all differences among the members of
the Germanic body.
A method of terminating territorial disputes between the States, under
the authority of the federal head, was not unattended to, even in the
imperfect system by which they have been hitherto held together. But
there are many other sources, besides interfering claims of boundary,
from which bickerings and animosities may spring up among the members of
the Union. To some of these we have been witnesses in the course of our
past experience. It will readily be conjectured that I allude to the
fraudulent laws which have been passed in too many of the States. And
though the proposed Constitution establishes particular guards against
the repetition of those instances which have heretofore made their
appearance, yet it is warrantable to apprehend that the spirit which
produced them will assume new shapes, that could not be foreseen nor
specifically provided against. Whatever practices may have a tendency
to disturb the harmony betw
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