vertheless, be conceded to them, agreeably to the interpretation given
to that maxim in the course of these papers, that it is not violated by
vesting the ultimate power of judging in a PART of the legislative body.
But though this be not an absolute violation of that excellent rule,
yet it verges so nearly upon it, as on this account alone to be less
eligible than the mode preferred by the convention. From a body which
had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect
a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application. The
same spirit which had operated in making them, would be too apt in
interpreting them; still less could it be expected that men who had
infringed the Constitution in the character of legislators, would be
disposed to repair the breach in the character of judges. Nor is this
all. Every reason which recommends the tenure of good behavior for
judicial offices, militates against placing the judiciary power, in
the last resort, in a body composed of men chosen for a limited period.
There is an absurdity in referring the determination of causes, in the
first instance, to judges of permanent standing; in the last, to those
of a temporary and mutable constitution. And there is a still greater
absurdity in subjecting the decisions of men, selected for their
knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study, to the
revision and control of men who, for want of the same advantage, cannot
but be deficient in that knowledge. The members of the legislature will
rarely be chosen with a view to those qualifications which fit men for
the stations of judges; and as, on this account, there will be great
reason to apprehend all the ill consequences of defective information,
so, on account of the natural propensity of such bodies to party
divisions, there will be no less reason to fear that the pestilential
breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice. The habit of
being continually marshalled on opposite sides will be too apt to stifle
the voice both of law and of equity.

These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those States who
have committed the judicial power, in the last resort, not to a part of
the legislature, but to distinct and independent bodies of men. Contrary
to the supposition of those who have represented the plan of the
convention, in this respect, as novel and unprecedented, it is but a
copy of the constitutions of New Hampshire, Massachusetts,