body was possessed of the means of punishing their
presumption, by degrading them from their stations. While this ought to
remove all apprehensions on the subject, it affords, at the same time,
a cogent argument for constituting the Senate a court for the trial of
impeachments.

Having now examined, and, I trust, removed the objections to the
distinct and independent organization of the Supreme Court, I proceed to
consider the propriety of the power of constituting inferior courts,(2)
and the relations which will subsist between these and the former.

The power of constituting inferior courts is evidently calculated to
obviate the necessity of having recourse to the Supreme Court in every
case of federal cognizance. It is intended to enable the national
government to institute or authorize, in each State or district of the
United States, a tribunal competent to the determination of matters of
national jurisdiction within its limits.

But why, it is asked, might not the same purpose have been accomplished
by the instrumentality of the State courts? This admits of different
answers. Though the fitness and competency of those courts should
be allowed in the utmost latitude, yet the substance of the power in
question may still be regarded as a necessary part of the plan, if it
were only to empower the national legislature to commit to them the
cognizance of causes arising out of the national Constitution. To confer
the power of determining such causes upon the existing courts of the
several States, would perhaps be as much "to constitute tribunals," as
to create new courts with the like power. But ought not a more direct
and explicit provision to have been made in favor of the State courts?
There are, in my opinion, substantial reasons against such a provision:
the most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a
local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the
jurisdiction of national causes; whilst every man may discover, that
courts constituted like those of some of the States would be improper
channels of the judicial authority of the Union. State judges, holding
their offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too
little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the
national laws. And if there was a necessity for confiding the original
cognizance of causes arising under those laws to them there would be
a correspondent necessity for leaving the door of appe