lained to
belong to the fourth of the enumerated classes, and have been shown
to be, in a peculiar manner, the proper subjects of the national
judicature.
From this review of the particular powers of the federal judiciary, as
marked out in the Constitution, it appears that they are all conformable
to the principles which ought to have governed the structure of that
department, and which were necessary to the perfection of the system.
If some partial inconveniences should appear to be connected with the
incorporation of any of them into the plan, it ought to be recollected
that the national legislature will have ample authority to make such
exceptions, and to prescribe such regulations as will be calculated to
obviate or remove these inconveniences. The possibility of particular
mischiefs can never be viewed, by a wellinformed mind, as a solid
objection to a general principle, which is calculated to avoid general
mischiefs and to obtain general advantages.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 81
The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority.
From McLEAN's Edition, New York. Wednesday, May 28, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
LET US now return to the partition of the judiciary authority between
different courts, and their relations to each other.
"The judicial power of the United States is" (by the plan of the
convention) "to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish."(1)
That there ought to be one court of supreme and final jurisdiction, is a
proposition which is not likely to be contested. The reasons for it have
been assigned in another place, and are too obvious to need repetition.
The only question that seems to have been raised concerning it, is,
whether it ought to be a distinct body or a branch of the legislature.
The same contradiction is observable in regard to this matter which has
been remarked in several other cases. The very men who object to
the Senate as a court of impeachments, on the ground of an improper
intermixture of powers, advocate, by implication at least, the propriety
of vesting the ultimate decision of all causes, in the whole or in a
part of the legislative body.
The arguments, or rather suggestions, upon which this charge is founded,
are to this effect: "The authority of the proposed Supreme Court of the
United States, which is to be a separate and in
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