s a circumstance calculated to have more
influence upon the character of our governments, than but few may be
aware of. The benefits of the integrity and moderation of the judiciary
have already been felt in more States than one; and though they may have
displeased those whose sinister expectations they may have disappointed,
they must have commanded the esteem and applause of all the virtuous
and disinterested. Considerate men, of every description, ought to prize
whatever will tend to beget or fortify that temper in the courts: as no
man can be sure that he may not be to-morrow the victim of a spirit of
injustice, by which he may be a gainer to-day. And every man must
now feel, that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the
foundations of public and private confidence, and to introduce in its
stead universal distrust and distress.

That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution,
and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts
of justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their
offices by a temporary commission. Periodical appointments, however
regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be
fatal to their necessary independence. If the power of making them was
committed either to the Executive or legislature, there would be danger
of an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to
both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of
either; if to the people, or to persons chosen by them for the special
purpose, there would be too great a disposition to consult popularity,
to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the
Constitution and the laws.

There is yet a further and a weightier reason for the permanency of
the judicial offices, which is deducible from the nature of the
qualifications they require. It has been frequently remarked, with great
propriety, that a voluminous code of laws is one of the inconveniences
necessarily connected with the advantages of a free government. To avoid
an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they
should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to
define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes
before them; and it will readily be conceived from the variety of
controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind,
that the records of those precedents must unavoidably sw