clusion would
always render the readmission of the person a remote and precarious
object, the observations which have been made will apply nearly as fully
to one case as to the other.

What are the advantages promised to counterbalance these disadvantages?
They are represented to be: 1st, greater independence in the magistrate;
2d, greater security to the people. Unless the exclusion be perpetual,
there will be no pretense to infer the first advantage. But even in that
case, may he have no object beyond his present station, to which he may
sacrifice his independence? May he have no connections, no friends, for
whom he may sacrifice it? May he not be less willing by a firm conduct,
to make personal enemies, when he acts under the impression that a time
is fast approaching, on the arrival of which he not only MAY, but
MUST, be exposed to their resentments, upon an equal, perhaps upon an
inferior, footing? It is not an easy point to determine whether his
independence would be most promoted or impaired by such an arrangement.

As to the second supposed advantage, there is still greater reason to
entertain doubts concerning it. If the exclusion were to be perpetual,
a man of irregular ambition, of whom alone there could be reason in any
case to entertain apprehension, would, with infinite reluctance, yield
to the necessity of taking his leave forever of a post in which his
passion for power and pre-eminence had acquired the force of habit. And
if he had been fortunate or adroit enough to conciliate the good-will
of the people, he might induce them to consider as a very odious
and unjustifiable restraint upon themselves, a provision which was
calculated to debar them of the right of giving a fresh proof of their
attachment to a favorite. There may be conceived circumstances in which
this disgust of the people, seconding the thwarted ambition of such
a favorite, might occasion greater danger to liberty, than could ever
reasonably be dreaded from the possibility of a perpetuation in office,
by the voluntary suffrages of the community, exercising a constitutional
privilege.

There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the people to
continue in office men who had entitled themselves, in their opinion,
to approbation and confidence; the advantages of which are at best
speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages far
more certain and decisive.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 73

The Provisio