having been drawn
into question by the adversaries of that plan, is no light symptom
of the rage for objection, which disorders their imaginations and
judgments. The standard of good behavior for the continuance in office
of the judicial magistracy, is certainly one of the most valuable of the
modern improvements in the practice of government. In a monarchy it is
an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is
a no less excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the
representative body. And it is the best expedient which can be
devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws.
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power must
perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each
other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be
the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because
it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive
not only dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community.
The legislature not only commands the purse, but prescribes the rules
by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated. The
judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or
the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be
said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the
efficacy of its judgments.
This simple view of the matter suggests several important consequences.
It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond comparison the
weakest of the three departments of power(1); that it can never attack
with success either of the other two; and that all possible care is
requisite to enable it to defend itself against their attacks. It
equally proves, that though individual oppression may now and then
proceed from the courts of justice, the general liberty of the people
can never be endangered from that quarter; I mean so long as the
judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the
Executive. For I agree, that "there is no liberty, if the power of
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers."(2)
And it proves, in the last place, that as liberty can have nothing to
fear from the judiciary alon
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