e, but would have every thing to fear from
its union with either of the other departments; that as all the effects
of such a union must ensue from a dependence of the former on the
latter, notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation; that as, from
the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy of
being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate branches; and
that as nothing can contribute so much to its firmness and independence
as permanency in office, this quality may therefore be justly regarded
as an indispensable ingredient in its constitution, and, in a great
measure, as the citadel of the public justice and the public security.

The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I
understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the
legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no
bills of attainder, no ex post facto laws, and the like. Limitations
of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the
medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void. Without this,
all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount to
nothing.

Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce
legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen
from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the
judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority which
can declare the acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to
the one whose acts may be declared void. As this doctrine is of great
importance in all the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the
ground on which it rests cannot be unacceptable.

There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that
every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the
commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act,
therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this,
would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that
the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people
are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of
powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what
they forbid.

If it be said that the legislative body