purchase
the integrity of the whole body, would be forced and improbable. A man
disposed to view human nature as it is, without either flattering
its virtues or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of
confidence in the probity of the Senate, to rest satisfied, not only
that it will be impracticable to the Executive to corrupt or seduce a
majority of its members, but that the necessity of its co-operation,
in the business of appointments, will be a considerable and salutary
restraint upon the conduct of that magistrate. Nor is the integrity
of the Senate the only reliance. The Constitution has provided some
important guards against the danger of executive influence upon the
legislative body: it declares that "No senator or representative shall
during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil
office under the United States, which shall have been created, or the
emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no
person, holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of
either house during his continuance in office."

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 77

The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive
Considered.

From The Independent Journal. Wednesday, April 2, 1788.

HAMILTON

To the People of the State of New York:

IT HAS been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the
co-operation of the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it
would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of
that body would be necessary to displace as well as to appoint. A change
of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or
so general a revolution in the officers of the government as might be
expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any
station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new
President would be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a
person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension that a discountenance
of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of
discredit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a
steady administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision which
connects the official existence of public men with the approbation or
disapprobation of that body which, from the greater permanency of its
own composition, will in all probability be less subject to inconstancy
than any ot