tution. But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such
inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, or in
the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. The President shall
have power to fill up all vacancies which may happen during the recess
of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of
their next session."

It has been observed in a former paper, that "the true test of a
good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good
administration." If the justness of this observation be admitted, the
mode of appointing the officers of the United States contained in the
foregoing clauses, must, when examined, be allowed to be entitled
to particular commendation. It is not easy to conceive a plan better
calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of men for filling
the offices of the Union; and it will not need proof, that on this point
must essentially depend the character of its administration.

It will be agreed on all hands, that the power of appointment, in
ordinary cases, ought to be modified in one of three ways. It ought
either to be vested in a single man, or in a select assembly of a
moderate number; or in a single man, with the concurrence of such an
assembly. The exercise of it by the people at large will be readily
admitted to be impracticable; as waiving every other consideration,
it would leave them little time to do anything else. When, therefore,
mention is made in the subsequent reasonings of an assembly or body
of men, what is said must be understood to relate to a select body or
assembly, of the description already given. The people collectively,
from their number and from their dispersed situation, cannot be
regulated in their movements by that systematic spirit of cabal and
intrigue, which will be urged as the chief objections to reposing the
power in question in a body of men.

Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject, or who have
attended to the observations made in other parts of these papers, in
relation to the appointment of the President, will, I presume, agree to
the position, that there would always be great probability of having the
place supplied by a man of abilities, at least respectable. Premising
this, I proceed to lay it down as a rule, that one man of discernment is
better fitted to analyze and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted
to particular offices, than a body of men of equal or perhaps even of