at every advantage to be
expected from such an arrangement would, in substance, be derived from
the power of nomination, which is proposed to be conferred upon him;
while several disadvantages which might attend the absolute power of
appointment in the hands of that officer would be avoided. In the act
of nomination, his judgment alone would be exercised; and as it would
be his sole duty to point out the man who, with the approbation of the
Senate, should fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete
as if he were to make the final appointment. There can, in this view, be
no difference between nominating and appointing. The same motives which
would influence a proper discharge of his duty in one case, would exist
in the other. And as no man could be appointed but on his previous
nomination, every man who might be appointed would be, in fact, his
choice.

But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might, yet this
could only be to make place for another nomination by himself. The
person ultimately appointed must be the object of his preference, though
perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not very probable that his
nomination would often be overruled. The Senate could not be tempted, by
the preference they might feel to another, to reject the one proposed;
because they could not assure themselves, that the person they
might wish would be brought forward by a second or by any subsequent
nomination. They could not even be certain, that a future nomination
would present a candidate in any degree more acceptable to them; and as
their dissent might cast a kind of stigma upon the individual rejected,
and might have the appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the
chief magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction would often
be refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the
refusal.

To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I answer,
that the necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though,
in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a
spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to prevent
the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family
connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity. In
addition to this, it would be an efficacious source of stability in the
administration.

It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had himself the sole
disposition