on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the
legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more
States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers
of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers, for
three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having particular
acquaintance with every class and circle of people, must exceed, beyond
all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description
who will be employed in the administration of the federal system.
Compare the members of the three great departments of the thirteen
States, excluding from the judiciary department the justices of
peace, with the members of the corresponding departments of the single
government of the Union; compare the militia officers of three millions
of people with the military and marine officers of any establishment
which is within the compass of probability, or, I may add, of
possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the advantage
of the States to be decisive. If the federal government is to have
collectors of revenue, the State governments will have theirs also. And
as those of the former will be principally on the seacoast, and not very
numerous, whilst those of the latter will be spread over the face of the
country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies
on the same side. It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and
may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes
throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be
resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option
will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous
collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under
the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the
officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States.
Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly
in the organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States
will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union. Should it
happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should
be appointed under the federal government, the influence of the whole
number would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of State
officers in the opposite scale. Within every district to which a federal
collector would be