taxed
on them. Had the States complied punctually with the articles of
Confederation, or could their compliance have been enforced by as
peaceable means as may be used with success towards single persons,
our past experience is very far from countenancing an opinion, that the
State governments would have lost their constitutional powers, and have
gradually undergone an entire consolidation. To maintain that such an
event would have ensued, would be to say at once, that the existence
of the State governments is incompatible with any system whatever that
accomplishes the essential purposes of the Union.

PUBLIUS

FEDERALIST No. 46

The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared

From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 29, 1788.

MADISON

To the People of the State of New York:

RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the
federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with
regard to the predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding
the different modes in which they are appointed, we must consider both
of them as substantially dependent on the great body of the citizens of
the United States. I assume this position here as it respects the
first, reserving the proofs for another place. The federal and State
governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people,
constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes.
The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the
people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have
viewed these different establishments, not only as mutual rivals and
enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts
to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be
reminded of their error. They must be told that the ultimate authority,
wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone, and
that it will not depend merely on the comparative ambition or address
of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be
able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other.
Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event in every case
should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their
common constituents.

Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem
to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of
the