by a superior share of representation. The
new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different from the
existing Confederation, as well as from that of the United Netherlands,
and other similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy
of the federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary
resolutions of the states composing the union. Hence the states,
though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal
influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of these subsequent
and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed Constitution, the
federal acts will take effect without the necessary intervention of the
individual States. They will depend merely on the majority of votes in
the federal legislature, and consequently each vote, whether proceeding
from a larger or smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or
powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner
as the votes individually given in a State legislature, by the
representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a
precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any difference in
the case, it proceeds from the difference in the personal character of
the individual representative, rather than from any regard to the extent
of the district from which he comes."

Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests
might employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little
strained in some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess that it fully
reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have
established.

In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation
and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the
census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a
considerable degree on the disposition, if not on the co-operation, of
the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as
little bias as possible, to swell or to reduce the amount of their
numbers. Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this
rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants.
Were the rule to decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary
temptation would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the
States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each
other, and produce the requisite impartiality.

PUBLIUS