the larger States, is not
likely to be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then,
for the former, lies between the proposed government and a government
still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of
prudence must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging
a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to
contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the
sacrifice.

In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed to
each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of
sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for
preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be
no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are
not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an
improper consolidation of the States into one simple republic.

Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the constitution of
the Senate is, the additional impediment it must prove against improper
acts of legislation. No law or resolution can now be passed without the
concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority
of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on
legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial;
and that the peculiar defense which it involves in favor of the smaller
States, would be more rational, if any interests common to them, and
distinct from those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to
peculiar danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by
their power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of
this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess
of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most
liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be
more convenient in practice than it appears to many in contemplation.

IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their appointment, come
next to be considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both of
these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are
to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be
necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from
the want of such an institution.

First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a