tment an idea inadmissible in a free government. But even there
the king is not bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are
answerable for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his
own conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard
the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.

But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally
responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the British
Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only ceases to
apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy of Great
Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited responsibility of
the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree as a hostage to the
national justice for his good behavior. In the American republic, it
would serve to destroy, or would greatly diminish, the intended and
necessary responsibility of the Chief Magistrate himself.

The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally obtained
in the State constitutions, has been derived from that maxim of
republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the hands of a
number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should be admitted to
be applicable to the case, I should contend that the advantage on that
side would not counterbalance the numerous disadvantages on the opposite
side. But I do not think the rule at all applicable to the executive
power. I clearly concur in opinion, in this particular, with a
writer whom the celebrated Junius pronounces to be "deep, solid, and
ingenious," that "the executive power is more easily confined when it
is ONE";(2) that it is far more safe there should be a single object for
the jealousy and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all
multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to
liberty.

A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of security
sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is unattainable.
Numbers must be so great as to render combination difficult, or they
are rather a source of danger than of security. The united credit and
influence of several individuals must be more formidable to liberty,
than the credit and influence of either of them separately. When power,
therefore, is placed in the hands of so small a number of men, as to
admit of their interests and views being easily combined in a common
enterprise, by an artful leader, it becomes more liabl