uled by my council. The council were so divided in their
opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better resolution on the
point." These and similar pretexts are constantly at hand, whether true
or false. And who is there that will either take the trouble or
incur the odium, of a strict scrutiny into the secret springs of the
transaction? Should there be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake
the unpromising task, if there happen to be collusion between the
parties concerned, how easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so
much ambiguity, as to render it uncertain what was the precise conduct
of any of those parties?
In the single instance in which the governor of this State is coupled
with a council--that is, in the appointment to offices, we have seen
the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration. Scandalous
appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases, indeed,
have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in the impropriety
of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame has been laid by the
governor on the members of the council, who, on their part, have charged
it upon his nomination; while the people remain altogether at a loss
to determine, by whose influence their interests have been committed
to hands so unqualified and so manifestly improper. In tenderness to
individuals, I forbear to descend to particulars.
It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of the
Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest securities
they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated power, first,
the restraints of public opinion, which lose their efficacy, as well on
account of the division of the censure attendant on bad measures among a
number, as on account of the uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and,
second, the opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the
misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their removal
from office or to their actual punishment in cases which admit of it.
In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which
has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable
for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can
be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional
council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give.
Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive
depar
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