next head
of our inquiries. The expediency of the junction of the Senate with
the Executive, in the power of appointing to offices, will, I trust, be
placed in a light not less satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the
same head. And I flatter myself the observations in my last paper must
have gone no inconsiderable way towards proving that it was not easy, if
practicable, to find a more fit receptacle for the power of determining
impeachments, than that which has been chosen. If this be truly the
case, the hypothetical dread of the too great weight of the Senate ought
to be discarded from our reasonings.
But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in the
remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed for the senators.
It was by them shown, as well on the credit of historical examples,
as from the reason of the thing, that the most POPULAR branch of every
government, partaking of the republican genius, by being generally the
favorite of the people, will be as generally a full match, if not an
overmatch, for every other member of the Government.
But independent of this most active and operative principle, to secure
the equilibrium of the national House of Representatives, the plan of
the convention has provided in its favor several important counterpoises
to the additional authorities to be conferred upon the Senate. The
exclusive privilege of originating money bills will belong to the
House of Representatives. The same house will possess the sole right of
instituting impeachments: is not this a complete counterbalance to that
of determining them? The same house will be the umpire in all elections
of the President, which do not unite the suffrages of a majority of
the whole number of electors; a case which it cannot be doubted will
sometimes, if not frequently, happen. The constant possibility of the
thing must be a fruitful source of influence to that body. The more it
is contemplated, the more important will appear this ultimate though
contingent power, of deciding the competitions of the most illustrious
citizens of the Union, for the first office in it. It would not perhaps
be rash to predict, that as a mean of influence it will be found to
outweigh all the peculiar attributes of the Senate.
A THIRD objection to the Senate as a court of impeachments, is drawn
from the agency they are to have in the appointments to office. It is
imagined that they would be too indulgent judges of the co
|