gain an improper ascendant in our
councils. How could they better gratify this, than by raising a creature
of their own to the chief magistracy of the Union? But the convention
have guarded against all danger of this sort, with the most provident
and judicious attention. They have not made the appointment of the
President to depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be
tampered with beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have
referred it in the first instance to an immediate act of the people of
America, to be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and
sole purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from
eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be
suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No senator,
representative, or other person holding a place of trust or profit under
the United States, can be of the numbers of the electors. Thus without
corrupting the body of the people, the immediate agents in the election
will at least enter upon the task free from any sinister bias. Their
transient existence, and their detached situation, already taken notice
of, afford a satisfactory prospect of their continuing so, to the
conclusion of it. The business of corruption, when it is to embrace so
considerable a number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor would
it be found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be
over thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which
though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be of a
nature to mislead them from their duty.

Another and no less important desideratum was, that the Executive should
be independent for his continuance in office on all but the people
themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to sacrifice his duty to his
complaisance for those whose favor was necessary to the duration of his
official consequence. This advantage will also be secured, by making his
re-election to depend on a special body of representatives, deputed by
the society for the single purpose of making the important choice.

All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by the
convention; which is, that the people of each State shall choose a
number of persons as electors, equal to the number of senators and
representatives of such State in the national government, who shall
assemble within the State, and vote for some fit person as President.
Their votes, t