hus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of the
national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority
of the whole number of votes will be the President. But as a majority of
the votes might not always happen to centre in one man, and as it
might be unsafe to permit less than a majority to be conclusive, it is
provided that, in such a contingency, the House of Representatives shall
select out of the candidates who shall have the five highest number
of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified for the
office.
The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of
President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent
degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for low
intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may alone suffice to
elevate a man to the first honors in a single State; but it will require
other talents, and a different kind of merit, to establish him in
the esteem and confidence of the whole Union, or of so considerable a
portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate
for the distinguished office of President of the United States. It will
not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability
of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and
virtue. And this will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of
the Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the
executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or ill
administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political heresy of
the poet who says:
"For forms of government let fools contest--That which is best
administered is best,"--yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test
of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good
administration.
The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the
President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in respect
to the former, what is to be done by the House of Representatives, in
respect to the latter.
The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President, has been
objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has been alleged,
that it would have been preferable to have authorized the Senate to
elect out of their own body an officer answering that description. But
two considerations seem to justify the ideas of the convention in
this respect. One is, that to secure at all ti
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