o had disposed of his fame, and
his most valuable rights as a citizen in one trial, should, in another
trial, for the same offense, be also the disposers of his life and
his fortune? Would there not be the greatest reason to apprehend, that
error, in the first sentence, would be the parent of error in the second
sentence? That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to overrule
the influence of any new lights which might be brought to vary the
complexion of another decision? Those who know anything of human nature,
will not hesitate to answer these questions in the affirmative; and will
be at no loss to perceive, that by making the same persons judges in
both cases, those who might happen to be the objects of prosecution
would, in a great measure, be deprived of the double security intended
them by a double trial. The loss of life and estate would often be
virtually included in a sentence which, in its terms, imported nothing
more than dismission from a present, and disqualification for a future,
office. It may be said, that the intervention of a jury, in the second
instance, would obviate the danger. But juries are frequently influenced
by the opinions of judges. They are sometimes induced to find special
verdicts, which refer the main question to the decision of the court.
Who would be willing to stake his life and his estate upon the verdict
of a jury acting under the auspices of judges who had predetermined his
guilt?

Would it have been an improvement of the plan, to have united the
Supreme Court with the Senate, in the formation of the court of
impeachments? This union would certainly have been attended with several
advantages; but would they not have been overbalanced by the signal
disadvantage, already stated, arising from the agency of the same judges
in the double prosecution to which the offender would be liable? To a
certain extent, the benefits of that union will be obtained from making
the chief justice of the Supreme Court the president of the court of
impeachments, as is proposed to be done in the plan of the convention;
while the inconveniences of an entire incorporation of the former into
the latter will be substantially avoided. This was perhaps the prudent
mean. I forbear to remark upon the additional pretext for clamor against
the judiciary, which so considerable an augmentation of its authority
would have afforded.

Would it have been desirable to have composed the court for the trial of
imp