d be likely to feel CONFIDENCE ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION, to
preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an
INDIVIDUAL accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, HIS ACCUSERS?
Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this
description? It is much to be doubted, whether the members of that
tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent a portion of
fortitude, as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a
task; and it is still more to be doubted, whether they would possess the
degree of credit and authority, which might, on certain occasions, be
indispensable towards reconciling the people to a decision that
should happen to clash with an accusation brought by their immediate
representatives. A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to the
accused; in the last, dangerous to the public tranquillity. The hazard
in both these respects, could only be avoided, if at all, by rendering
that tribunal more numerous than would consist with a reasonable
attention to economy. The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of
impeachments, is equally dictated by the nature of the proceeding. This
can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation
of the offense by the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the
judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in
favor of personal security. There will be no jury to stand between the
judges who are to pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party
who is to receive or suffer it. The awful discretion which a court of
impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy
the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the
community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of
persons.
These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a conclusion,
that the Supreme Court would have been an improper substitute for
the Senate, as a court of impeachments. There remains a further
consideration, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. It
is this: The punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon
impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender.
After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and
confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still
be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.
Would it be proper that the persons wh
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