nstitution in the aggregate, and treat with
severity some of the most unexceptionable articles in it.
The second section gives power to the President, "BY AND WITH THE ADVICE
AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, TO MAKE TREATIES, PROVIDED TWO THIRDS OF THE
SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR."
The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it
relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but
in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will afford the highest
security that it will be exercised by men the best qualified for the
purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the public good. The
convention appears to have been attentive to both these points: they
have directed the President to be chosen by select bodies of electors,
to be deputed by the people for that express purpose; and they have
committed the appointment of senators to the State legislatures. This
mode has, in such cases, vastly the advantage of elections by the people
in their collective capacity, where the activity of party zeal, taking
the advantage of the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears
of the unwary and interested, often places men in office by the votes of
a small proportion of the electors.
As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as the
State legislatures who appoint the senators, will in general be composed
of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is reason to
presume that their attention and their votes will be directed to those
men only who have become the most distinguished by their abilities and
virtue, and in whom the people perceive just grounds for confidence.
The Constitution manifests very particular attention to this object. By
excluding men under thirty-five from the first office, and those under
thirty from the second, it confines the electors to men of whom the
people have had time to form a judgment, and with respect to whom they
will not be liable to be deceived by those brilliant appearances of
genius and patriotism, which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead
as well as dazzle. If the observation be well founded, that wise kings
will always be served by able ministers, it is fair to argue, that as an
assembly of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings,
the means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and
characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of
discretion and discernment. The inference whic
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