parties, but by both; and consequently,
that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first,
so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed
Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation
of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful
reach of legislative acts now, as they will be at any future period, or
under any form of government.

However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when like bile in
the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic, the eyes of both
become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which that
malady casts on surrounding objects. From this cause, probably, proceed
the fears and apprehensions of some, that the President and Senate may
make treaties without an equal eye to the interests of all the States.
Others suspect that two thirds will oppress the remaining third, and
ask whether those gentlemen are made sufficiently responsible for their
conduct; whether, if they act corruptly, they can be punished; and
if they make disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those
treaties?

As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by men
the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their
constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence in that
body, especially while they continue to be careful in appointing proper
persons, and to insist on their punctual attendance. In proportion as
the United States assume a national form and a national character, so
will the good of the whole be more and more an object of attention, and
the government must be a weak one indeed, if it should forget that the
good of the whole can only be promoted by advancing the good of each
of the parts or members which compose the whole. It will not be in the
power of the President and Senate to make any treaties by which they and
their families and estates will not be equally bound and affected with
the rest of the community; and, having no private interests distinct
from that of the nation, they will be under no temptations to neglect
the latter.

As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must either have been
very unfortunate in his intercourse with the world, or possess a heart
very susceptible of such impressions, who can think it probable that
the President and two thirds of the Senate will ever be capable of
such unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross