and too invidious to be
entertained. But in such a case, if it should ever happen, the treaty so
obtained from us would, like all other fraudulent contracts, be null and
void by the law of nations.
With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to conceive how
it could be increased. Every consideration that can influence the
human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations, conscience, the love
of country, and family affections and attachments, afford security for
their fidelity. In short, as the Constitution has taken the utmost care
that they shall be men of talents and integrity, we have reason to be
persuaded that the treaties they make will be as advantageous as, all
circumstances considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of
punishment and disgrace can operate, that motive to good behavior is
amply afforded by the article on the subject of impeachments.
PUBLIUS
FEDERALIST No. 65
The Powers of the Senate Continued
From the New York Packet. Friday, March 7, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the
Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation
with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial
character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business
of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the
provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the
examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head
with a view of the judicial character of the Senate.
A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not
more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly
elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the
abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may
with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly
to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of
them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the
whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or
inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with
the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities,
partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and
in such cases t
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