n will see and confess that
it is well provided for by making concurrence of the Senate necessary
both to treaties and to laws.
It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature,
but that perfect SECRECY and immediate DESPATCH are sometimes requisite.
These are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained,
if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of
discovery. Those apprehensions will operate on those persons whether
they are actuated by mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless
are many of both descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the
President, but who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still
less in that of a large popular Assembly. The convention have done
well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that
although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and
consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of
intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.
They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must have
perceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular in their
duration, strength, and direction, and seldom found to run twice exactly
in the same manner or measure. To discern and to profit by these tides
in national affairs is the business of those who preside over them; and
they who have had much experience on this head inform us, that there
frequently are occasions when days, nay, even when hours, are precious.
The loss of a battle, the death of a prince, the removal of a minister,
or other circumstances intervening to change the present posture and
aspect of affairs, may turn the most favorable tide into a course
opposite to our wishes. As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are
moments to be seized as they pass, and they who preside in either should
be left in capacity to improve them. So often and so essentially have
we heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and despatch, that the
Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no attention had
been paid to those objects. Those matters which in negotiations usually
require the most secrecy and the most despatch, are those preparatory
and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important in a national
view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment of the objects of
the negotiation. For these, the President will find no difficulty to
provide; and should any circumst
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