lic. At the same time, this
advantage ought not to be considered as superseding the use of auxiliary
precautions. It may even be remarked, that the same extended situation,
which will exempt the people of America from some of the dangers
incident to lesser republics, will expose them to the inconveniency
of remaining for a longer time under the influence of those
misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may
succeed in distributing among them.
It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to recollect that
history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate.
Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only states to whom that
character can be applied. In each of the two first there was a senate
for life. The constitution of the senate in the last is less known.
Circumstantial evidence makes it probable that it was not different in
this particular from the two others. It is at least certain, that it
had some quality or other which rendered it an anchor against popular
fluctuations; and that a smaller council, drawn out of the senate,
was appointed not only for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These
examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to
the genius, of America, are, notwithstanding, when compared with the
fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very
instructive proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend
stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which
distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well
ancient as modern; and which render extreme circumspection necessary, in
reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight
to this consideration, it may still be maintained, that there are many
points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our
attention. Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be
supplied by a senatorial institution, are common to a numerous assembly
frequently elected by the people, and to the people themselves. There
are others peculiar to the former, which require the control of such an
institution. The people can never wilfully betray their own interests;
but they may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people;
and the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative
trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the
concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodi
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