senator should
have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages;
and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign
nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned
from the prepossessions and habits incident to foreign birth and
education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity
between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents
may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate
and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign
influence on the national councils.

II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators
by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been
devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has
been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the
public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring
a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an
agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the
authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two
systems.

III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point,
which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite
pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much
discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly
incorporated into one nation, every district ought to have a
PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among independent and
sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties,
however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share in the common
councils, it does not appear to be without some reason that in a
compound republic, partaking both of the national and federal character,
the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of
proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by
the standard of theory, a part of the Constitution which is allowed on
all hands to be the result, not of theory, but "of a spirit of amity,
and that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our
political situation rendered indispensable." A common government, with
powers equal to its objects, is called for by the voice, and still more
loudly by the political situation, of America. A government founded on
principles more consonant to the wishes of