be
considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising
expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as
inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free
inhabitants, which regards the SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the
MAN.

"After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the
Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? We have hitherto
proceeded on the idea that representation related to persons only, and
not at all to property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted
no less for protection of the property, than of the persons, of
individuals. The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered
as represented by those who are charged with the government. Upon this
principle it is, that in several of the States, and particularly in
the State of New York, one branch of the government is intended more
especially to be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected
by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of
government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not prevail.
The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the
personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property
in the choice of those hands.

"For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the
people of each State, ought to bear some proportion to the comparative
wealth of the States. States have not, like individuals, an influence
over each other, arising from superior advantages of fortune. If the
law allows an opulent citizen but a single vote in the choice of his
representative, the respect and consequence which he derives from his
fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the
objects of his choice; and through this imperceptible channel the
rights of property are conveyed into the public representation. A State
possesses no such influence over other States. It is not probable that
the richest State in the Confederacy will ever influence the choice of
a single representative in any other State. Nor will the representatives
of the larger and richer States possess any other advantage in the
federal legislature, over the representatives of other States, than what
may result from their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their
superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it
ought to be secured to them