trongest, might accomplish the destruction of the
Union, by seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among
the people (and which perhaps they may themselves have excited),
to discontinue the choice of members for the federal House of
Representatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm union
of this country, under an efficient government, will probably be an
increasing object of jealousy to more than one nation of Europe; and
that enterprises to subvert it will sometimes originate in the intrigues
of foreign powers, and will seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by
some of them. Its preservation, therefore ought in no case that can
be avoided, to be committed to the guardianship of any but those whose
situation will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and
vigilant performance of the trust.
PUBLIUS
1. 1st clause, 4th section, of the 1st article.
FEDERALIST No. 60
The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate
the Election of Members)
From The Independent Journal. Saturday, February 23, 1788.
HAMILTON
To the People of the State of New York:
WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the
federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State
legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other
side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own
elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended, that this right
would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the
representation. The interest of all would, in this respect at least,
be the security of all. But it is alleged, that it might be employed in
such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of
men in exclusion of others, by confining the places of election to
particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens
at large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions,
this seems to be the most chimerical. On the one hand, no rational
calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the
disposition which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply,
could ever find its way into the national councils; and on the other,
it may be concluded with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should
ever gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form
altogether different and far more decisive.
The improbability of the atte
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