n, which presents to mankind so many
political lessons, both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and
which has been frequently consulted in the course of these inquiries,
corroborates the result of the reflections which we have just made. The
number of inhabitants in the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot
be stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of these
eight millions in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and
fifty-eight. Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and
sixty-four persons, and one half, by five thousand seven hundred and
twenty-three persons.(1) It cannot be supposed that the half thus
elected, and who do not even reside among the people at large, can add
any thing either to the security of the people against the government,
or to the knowledge of their circumstances and interests in the
legislative councils. On the contrary, it is notorious, that they are
more frequently the representatives and instruments of the executive
magistrate, than the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They
might therefore, with great propriety, be considered as something more
than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the nation. We
will, however, consider them in this light alone, and will not extend
the deduction to a considerable number of others, who do not reside
among their constitutents, are very faintly connected with them, and
have very little particular knowledge of their affairs. With all these
concessions, two hundred and seventy-nine persons only will be the
depository of the safety, interest, and happiness of eight millions that
is to say, there will be one representative only to maintain the rights
and explain the situation of TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND
SEVENTY constitutents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of
executive influence, and extending its authority to every object of
legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree
diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that
a valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these
circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable,
in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature
concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the
weight which is due to it, and comparing it with that of the House
of Representatives as above explained it seems to give the fullest
assurance, that
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