f two thirds
of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the
constitution, or CORRECTING BREACHES OF IT, a convention shall be called
for the purpose."
As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from
them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches
of government hold their power, is derived, it seems strictly consonant
to the republican theory, to recur to the same original authority, not
only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the
powers of the government, but also whenever any one of the departments
may commit encroachments on the chartered authorities of the others. The
several departments being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their
common commission, none of them, it is evident, can pretend to an
exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their
respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the stronger to
be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without
an appeal to the people themselves, who, as the grantors of the
commissions, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its
observance?
There is certainly great force in this reasoning, and it must be allowed
to prove that a constitutional road to the decision of the people ought
to be marked out and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary
occasions. But there appear to be insuperable objections against the
proposed recurrence to the people, as a provision in all cases for
keeping the several departments of power within their constitutional
limits.
In the first place, the provision does not reach the case of a
combination of two of the departments against the third. If the
legislative authority, which possesses so many means of operating on the
motives of the other departments, should be able to gain to its interest
either of the others, or even one third of its members, the remaining
department could derive no advantage from its remedial provision. I do
not dwell, however, on this objection, because it may be thought to
be rather against the modification of the principle, than against the
principle itself.
In the next place, it may be considered as an objection inherent in the
principle, that as every appeal to the people would carry an implication
of some defect in the government, frequent appeals would, in a great
measure, deprive the government of that veneration which time bestows on
every thing
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